CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.696
9 February 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 February 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alessandro Vattani (Italy)

GE.95-60449 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 696th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I would like to extend a welcome in our midst to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, His Excellency, Mr. Mohamed-Salah Dembri, who will be the first speaker today. Before his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs His Excellency Mr. Dembri occupied very senior State posts: he was, in particular, Secretary-General in the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Secretary-General in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Secretary-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to Canada and Greece. His presence in our midst today is proof of the sustained interest of his country in the cause of disarmament and the importance it attaches to our forum. I am certain that his statement will be followed with keen interest by the Conference.

Aside from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Romania, Ukraine and Australia. I intend to hold a brief informal meeting immediately following this plenary meeting, to be devoted to an exchange of views on an important and urgent subject. This informal meeting will be held in the presence of the members of the Conference alone. I invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria to make a statement.

Mr. DEMBRI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and express my satisfaction that the work of this body is being guided by a distinguished representative of Italy, a country with which Algeria has ties based on common history and geography. I wish you every success as you carry out your duties and assure you of the full cooperation of the delegation of Algeria. I welcome the presence of His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as that of his deputy, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, and his staff, whose dedication and professionalism make a major contribution to the success of the work of the Conference.

In addressing you today, I have come to testify to the importance attached by Algeria to the work of this body and to tell you of our concern to contribute effectively to the overall disarmament effort. The threats to the stability of certain regions, the rise and exacerbation of factors contributing to ethnic and religious intolerance, as well as terrorism, have been added to long-standing and still unresolved crises and the burdens caused by the maintenance of considerable stockpiles, including stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. By rejecting doctrines that rely on the balance of terror, we can more readily base our choice on a genuine struggle for peace. In its overall approach Algeria places all its trust in multilateral action in the field of disarmament. Here, in Algeria's view, is the appropriate context for cooperation and trust among States.

(Mr. Dembri, Algeria)

On 12 January last, Algeria deposited its instruments of accession to the Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation, thus confirming that it uses nuclear energy for strictly civilian purposes. In addition to being an act of faith in the non-proliferation regime, this accession confirms a well established policy as regards the use of the atom, under which Algeria has from the outset voluntarily placed its research and radio-isotope production facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It also testifies to our determination to contribute to the successful conclusion of the NPT review and extension Conference next April and thus to join an increasingly universal approach to nuclear non-proliferation. These are among the many reasons that have led us to address responsibly and frankly the uncertainties which could prevent the success of the Conference.

The effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime is dependent on its universality. With the current number of States parties, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the disarmament instrument that is most widely accepted by the international community. It plays the role of a buttress against proliferation and facilitates cooperation amongst States in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus, and in order to attain universality, it is appropriate to take the necessary steps to encourage even broader accession and to correct the imperfections in the Treaty and its imbalances. The non-aligned countries, including those in this forum, have regularly repeated legitimate expectations along these lines. The results shown by the four preceding review conferences should be considered in depth. We believe that it is high time to honour the commitments entered into by the nuclear States, in particular the commitment to introduce decisive disarmament measures. The delay so far undoubtedly calls the validity of these commitments into question and jeopardizes the structure built around the treaty. We believe that it is high time to do justice to the States which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option by rapidly drawing up a legally binding international instrument against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Finally, all signatories should be guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology. Next April's Conference cannot be reduced to no more than a debate on the extension of the NPT. It should also be an opportunity for joint examination of the type of action required to restore the true vocation of the Treaty, that of a disarmament instrument which promotes peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Algeria has been participating actively in promoting Africa as a denuclearized zone. We hope that the last obstacles to this undertaking will soon be removed and that the nuclear-weapon States will respect the future status of the continent once the treaty comes into force. We might recall that this objective, set more than 30 years ago by the Organization of African Unity, has become attainable since South Africa put an end to its military nuclear programme - a very significant and welcome gesture. It is high time that Israel followed suit so as to bring closer the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The universal dimension of the non-proliferation Treaty cannot suffer any limitations. The Arab countries have already made their contribution to the non-proliferation regime by acceding to the Treaty and working for the promotion of the Middle East as

(Mr. Dembri, Algeria)

a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Hence they expect Israel to make an equivalent commitment by acceding to the NPT and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime.

The state of the negotiations on the nuclear-test-ban treaty leads us to think that the Conference on Disarmament will not manage to conclude its work before the Conference for the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons next April, as demanded by the non-aligned countries, nor before the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as hoped for by the Government of Japan. If this is so, how can we maintain the momentum brought about by the negotiations on the nuclear-test-ban treaty and ensure that the Conference on Disarmament succeeds in concluding its work within a reasonable time-frame? This question is all the more relevant in so far as the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have more or less remained a dead letter since 1968. Algeria hopes that an effective comprehensive test-ban treaty will be concluded as soon as possible. We believe that this is a realistic goal, given the encouraging progress made last year under the energetic guidance of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and the chairmen of the working groups. We hope that the negotiations will continue in the best possible climate. We are aware that the establishment of interconnected monitoring systems is vital to the viability of the regime. Algeria could, at the appropriate time, consider making available to these systems its seismological and atmospheric radioactivity monitoring stations in the context of the networks proposed. We expect that the nuclear-weapon States will show their commitment to further progress by refraining from new experiments and agreeing to endorse the proposals made by the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those regarding the universal and comprehensive scope of the prohibition and the structure and methods of operation of the organization responsible for the implementation of the treaty.

Last year the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Special Coordinator and entrusted him with holding consultations on the manner in which negotiations might proceed towards a convention on fissile material. The adoption of such a convention would undoubtedly constitute a decisive phase in the process of nuclear disarmament. Consequently, we believe that this endeavour should take place in its proper context. Discharges of highly enriched uranium and plutonium occurring as a result of the process of nuclear disarmament, the unauthorized burial of radioactive material, clandestine trade in fissile material and the acquisition by certain countries of undeclared nuclear capabilities clearly demonstrate that the international community cannot fail to give serious consideration to the question of existing fissile material stocks. We do not consider a ban on production in itself to be sufficient. We think that the question of existing stockpiles ought to be taken into account. The ad hoc committee which there is now consensus on establishing should be given a mandate taking into account the real need for disarmament and not just a selective reduction of the risks of non-proliferation. In this way it should focus its work from the outset on setting up a monitoring system based on transparency and universality.

(Mr. Dembri, Algeria)

It is true that in overall terms the end of the cold war has made it possible to ward off the risks of a world war, to bring about some improvements in the attitudes of States as regards their own security, to open up new prospects for disarmament and arms control. However, peace and stability call for continuous efforts, and this includes our Mediterranean region. For its part, Algeria pursues its regional approach within the framework of efforts to prevent and allay sources of tension. Whether it be for the settlement of the Western Sahara question, in the Sahelo-Saharan region, in the Maghreb or in the Mediterranean region, our actions are based on the patient building of focuses of peace, consultation and cooperation. Through this resolute policy, Algeria is participating in the collective effort to settle international disputes and eliminate sources promoting friction and an arms race in its immediate environment. Another illustration of this approach is the implementation of the process of ratification of the chemical weapons Convention, an instrument brought about by the collective efforts of the members of this Conference, which is now a landmark in the field of disarmament as regards both the range of the areas it covers and the mechanisms that it establishes.

At the domestic level my country has the difficult task of rooting a young and ambitious society in progress and modernity through a pluralistic democracy, promotion of the components of national identity, an economy open towards the world and the realization of ideals of justice, peace and development. It is within this context that Algeria is resolutely struggling against violence and terrorism, both their manifestations and their causes. This struggle stems from the obligation to guarantee, in pride of place among human rights, protection of the fundamental right to life, as well as the determination to establish irrevocably the mechanisms that should serve as a basis for a democracy, the most precious legacy we will leave to future generations.

In sharing these thoughts with you, I would like to convey to you the message of our hopes and our certainty as regards the role that could be played and the contribution that could be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the context of the efforts of the international community as a whole to bring about peace, cooperation and harmony among peoples. You may be assured that, to this end, the delegation of Algeria will continue to make its full contribution to the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

(continued in English)

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka. As we are all aware, this is the last time that Ambassador Tanaka will address our Conference before leaving Geneva after an impressive tour of duty. Not only has Ambassador Tanaka served his country with distinction but he had also played an active and effective role at

(The President)

key moments in the Conference's negotiating history. I would cite Ambassador Tanaka's involvement in the final stages of the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention. More particularly, the members of this Conference will remember with gratitude the way in which he skilfully conducted the consultations which led to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with its present negotiating mandate, the subsequent intensification of its work, and which we all hope will soon lead to the completion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. On behalf of the Conference, I should like to extend our best wishes to Ambassador Yoshi Tanaka and his family and wish them every happiness in the future. I should now like to give the floor to Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, thank you very much for these very warm words extended to me. When I took the floor at this year's first plenary of the Conference on Disarmament last week, I congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency and expressed my confidence in your leadership. I should now like to congratulate you on your success in achieving agreement on the Presidential statement on the organization of the work of the Conference and getting its substantive work under way. I reiterate my confidence in your able leadership and assure you of the full cooperation of the delegation of Japan. I heartily welcome His Excellency Mr. Dembri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, who has just addressed the Conference.

As it is only a few days before I shall leave Geneva, I feel greatly honoured to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. It was in April 1992 when I arrived here to join those who had been working so hard to conclude the chemical weapons Convention. The success in totally prohibiting one category of weapon of mass destruction impressed the world with the competence of this sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. While addressing such issues as a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, negative security assurances, outer space and transparency in armaments, I have welcomed many new colleagues and seen off many good friends. Finally, the time has come for me to bid farewell to the Conference.

I am proud to have been a part of the Conference on Disarmament. The CD is a small world. In fashion and music circles, of course, CD has a different meaning. While those other CDs may be more popular, our Conference on Disarmament has played and continues to play a crucial role in the maintenance of the peace and security of the international community. It has given birth to such agreements as the partial test-ban Treaty, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the sea-bed Treaty, the biological weapons Convention and the chemical weapons Convention.

In 1993, I had the privilege to chair the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which had been re-established after a one-year interval. Although the Committee did not have a negotiating mandate then, I was able to encourage the Committee to enter into such discussions as might be found useful once we did move into a negotiating mode. History was made when the Conference agreed to negotiate a CTBT on 10 August of that year.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Last year, substantial progress was made in the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Committee conducted under the chairmanship of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico. In particular, the Working Group on Verification chaired by Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany succeeded in providing us with a concrete idea as to how the verification system should look, building on the really intensive work of the experts. That work has already resumed this year in an effort to further elaborate and refine the system.

As basic technical issues have generally been clarified, it is now time for us to engage in the sensitive parts of these negotiations, which require political decisions by CD member States. These issues include the scope of the prohibition, questions relating to the CTBT organization, including the composition and the powers of the Executive Council, the degree of intrusiveness and the decision-making procedure of on-site inspections, and those issues relating to the entry into force and duration of, and withdrawal from, the treaty. As my last endeavour in this Conference, I would like to urge my colleagues to redouble their efforts to overcome their differences and conclude a CTBT as soon as possible. I wish Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, the new Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, every success.

Among politically important issues, perhaps the most sensitive is the question of the scope of the CTBT. In the statement made by a senior official of the United States Government at the first plenary meeting of this year's CD session, the basic position of one major nuclear-weapon State was clearly expounded. From the Japanese point of view, what is of key importance is that the future CTBT be truly comprehensive. We must allow no exception to this rule, and should get rid of all possible loopholes. If we succeed in confirming this in the treaty text, it should be regarded as a major breakthrough in our negotiations and will no doubt facilitate the early conclusion of the treaty.

I should also like to briefly touch upon the issue of the fissile cut-off. In doing so, I am not implying that other issues such as NSA and TIA are not important. However, the cut-off is one such very important item in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We should not make ourselves choose all or nothing, but should seek steady, rather than dramatic, progress. The consultations on the mandate for the negotiations should not drag on endlessly. I hope that the difficulties will be overcome as soon as possible under the leadership of Ambassador Shannon of Canada, Special Coordinator on the topic, and that negotiations will commence in the Conference before long.

I said that I am proud of having been a part of the CD. I am not sorry that I have to leave Geneva before I see the conclusion of a CTBT and the commencement of the cut-off negotiations, as I am confident that both will take place. I leave these important matters in your hands, my colleagues. And I sincerely hope that at some point in the future I will hear you too say, perhaps with even a greater degree of satisfaction than mine, that you are proud of having been a part of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

In conclusion, let me thank my colleagues for their cooperation, friendship, encouragement and even criticism, for I value all these accorded to me. I should also like to thank the secretariat, headed by Mr. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference, and in particular his deputy, Mr. Bensmail, the political officers, interpreters, translators and everyone else engaged in providing conference services, for their valuable contributions to the important work of this august body. Mr. President, dear colleagues, thank you and farewell.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me, and I wish him all happiness for the future. I now give the floor to the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador Moser.

Mr. MOSER (Switzerland) (translated from French): Allow me first of all to congratulate His Excellency Mr. Mohamed-Salah Dembri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, on his important statement.

Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I take the floor at the time when you are in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. Your talents as a diplomat offer us a guarantee of success in our work. To put it in the third official language of your host country:

(continued in Italian)

So it is with great pleasure that I convey my greetings to you in the Chair. I am convinced that, as the representative of the great nation to the South of the Alps, a diplomat of long experience who has served as Director-General at the Farnesina, you will skilfully direct the work of the Conference.

(continued in French)

Our esteem is also addressed to your eminent predecessor, Mr. President, His Excellency the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Sirous Nasseri, for the exemplary way in which he discharged his duties during the previous term of the presidency of the Conference. We also thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, as well as all the members of the secretariat.

Everyone agrees that there are too many weapons in the world. The difficulties begin when excessive accumulations of weapons have to be located. The Conference on Disarmament would be the ideal forum to address all these problems, as long as it succeeds in solving the question of its expansion and acquiring that representativeness which is also expected from the conventions it draws up. Switzerland would be happy to participate in the Conference on Disarmament as a full-fledged member. Once we have become a member State we will find it easier to obtain the necessary appropriations better to support the purposes and the work of the Conference. The example of inspections

(Mr. Moser, Switzerland)

within the context of the United Nations Special Commission has shown that Switzerland has internationally recognized experts in this field. It is in this context that I address the Conference today.

In my delegation's view the Conference on Disarmament should address - and concern itself with - not only weapons of mass destruction but also so-called conventional weapons. Today the latter entail extremely serious security risks. Since the Ad Hoc Committee in the field of transparency in armaments, so skilfully led by Ambassador Boytha last year, was the only one to deal with the sector of conventional weapons, it absolutely must be maintained. At the same time, the group of governmental experts entrusted with the task of studying and improving the operation of the United Nations arms register must succeed in expanding this register in a realistic way. In this entire problem area we should take account of military stockpiles as well as national production.

The Swiss authorities wish to pay Ambassador Marín Bosch, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassador Hoffmann and Ambassador Dembinski, a well-deserved tribute for the progress accomplished towards the drawing up of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban convention, particularly as regards the technical issues of verification and institutional issues. The groundwork has thus been laid to approach the substantive issues which require more political decisions. In this context Switzerland favours as comprehensive a test ban as possible. A general clause would be the most appropriate legal means to arrive at this goal. Exceptions authorizing certain types of nuclear testing might render the convention meaningless. Peaceful explosions cannot be distinguished from "non-peaceful" explosions as far as their effects are concerned, and therefore should also be prohibited. They have little practical significance but may have serious effects to the detriment of the environment. The development of "peaceful" nuclear explosives cannot be distinguished from the development of nuclear weapons. The test ban should be considered to be an important step towards nuclear disarmament. The verification regime should make use of a number of means of detection, among which seismological detection will have a central role, without neglecting the three other methods selected by the working group. This choice does not rule out the adding of other methods with experience, under an evolutionary approach. We will have to think jointly about the distribution of responsibilities between the States parties and the international organization entrusted with applying the treaty. Generally speaking, a balance will have to be struck to draw up satisfactory arrangements in terms of cost-effectiveness. The Swiss Federal Council has decided to contribute to the exploratory phase of GSETT-3 in the shape of a beta station. Essential to confidence in the convention, we believe, is the effectiveness of the international organization we are to create. At first glance it appears tempting to make use of IAEA for monitoring compliance with the convention. However, we should be aware that IAEA has another calling. The international monitoring system that we are contemplating is an innovation and there will be a need for special experts, as well as inspectors on an exceptional basis to conduct on-site inspections. The expertise of other organizations might also be required. The desired universality of this

(Mr. Moser, Switzerland)

convention should also be sought in the arrangements we shall draw up for its entry into force. For the same reasons, withdrawal from the convention should not be made too easy. What we need is to seek, for the rules governing entry into force, a formula which naturally ensures the commitment of the largest possible number of States, on condition that it includes not only the nuclear Powers but also all States with a nuclear capability and, in particular, the so-called threshold States. However, we should try to find a mechanism to prevent this entry into force from becoming dependent on the particular will of a State or group of States. In this regard too it is crucial for the success of these negotiations that the Conference on Disarmament should proceed to the expansion of its membership. Hence we are confident that substantial work leading to the conclusion of a convention on a comprehensive test ban can be accomplished in the short term. The adoption of certain fundamental decisions will be of crucial importance with a view to the NPT review and extension Conference in April-May this year. Within the same context it would be useful to resume work on the issue of negative security assurances, led last year in an inventive and open-minded spirit by Ambassador Guillaume, to whose efforts we pay tribute.

A fundamental step towards arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of production of fissile material for military purposes. We deeply regret that a mandate to negotiate such a convention within the context of this Conference has not yet been drawn up, and we believe that the controversies that have arisen concerning the content of this mandate should not be settled in an a priori manner but only in the negotiations on the convention themselves. We would like to thank Ambassador Shannon for the tireless efforts he has made within the context of his mandate.

The issue of the prevention of an arms race in space is closely linked to the set of problems relating to nuclear disarmament. My country wishes to see the adoption of specific measures that can effectively impede an arms race, while permitting the use of ballistic technologies for peaceful purposes.

Switzerland follows the work of the Conference on Disarmament with great interest. We wish the Conference a year brimming with progress and success, and we hope that it will be able to broaden its field of action in order to ensure arms control which is increasingly effective on the world scale.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Switzerland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair

(continued in Italian)

and I thank him too for his kind remarks made in the beautiful language of Dante.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, at the outset, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and let me wholeheartedly thank you for the way you have guided us at this very critical stage and secured at least the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee which is of foremost importance to all of us, i.e. the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. I sincerely hope that the pending establishment of the other three ad hoc committees on prevention of an arms race in outer space, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and transparency in armaments will be resolved speedily. Furthermore, I hope the CD will be ready rather soon to establish an ad hoc committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, to which my Government attaches the greatest importance.

In United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/70 - adopted by consensus - on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the CD is called upon to proceed to a new phase of negotiations, to negotiate intensively, as a high-priority task, and to conclude a CTBT without delay. My Government fully subscribes to this goal and is committed to the conclusion of such a treaty at the earliest possible date. Nobody will deny the importance of CTBT negotiations in the run-up to the NPT review and extension Conference. As Ambassador Ralph Earle of the United States declared in this forum a week ago, we should achieve as much progress as possible in the test-ban negotiations before that conference convenes in April. Spelling out what such progress could mean with regard to the substance of a CTBT, some key issues come to my mind such as scope and basic obligations, political issues in the area of on-site inspections, such as the relevant trigger mechanism, and the further elaboration of an international monitoring system based upon the results of the IMS Expert Group. I am confident that our newly appointed Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland, and the chairmen of the two working groups on verification and legal and institutional questions will organize the CTBT negotiations in such a way that substantive progress on outstanding treaty issues can be made prior to the NPT conference. As I take the floor for the first time, allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate Ambassador Dembinski on the assumption of his difficult task and to wish him all the best. Furthermore, I would like to assure you of my Government's support for inter-sessional meetings of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, within the framework of a consensus decision.

In this context I am gratified to hear that the IMS Expert Group started its work last Monday under the able guidance of Dr. Peter Marshall. I may recall that the verification Working Group managed to give this Expert Group a mandate on their work at the closure of last year's session so that the experts can pursue their work on safe grounds.

Fortunately one stumbling-block in the course of the CTBT negotiations has been removed: I need not repeat that the former United States position on the "right to withdraw from the CTBT 10 years after it enters into force"

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

had caused German concerns which were voiced by my delegation when the United States introduced that position last year. We therefore very much welcome the United States decision to withdraw its proposal.

My delegation strongly favours the speedy and smooth re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negative security assurances are an issue of high importance to many countries. Failure to establish such a Committee on this subject could also be perceived as a wrong signal in view of the forthcoming NPT Conference. Furthermore, I hope that the ongoing discussions of the nuclear-weapon States on this question will come to a satisfactory result in the next weeks. This could further the work in the NSA Ad Hoc Committee, hopefully established at that time. We see the security assurances recently extended by some nuclear-weapon States to Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as an important step towards progress in this field.

Germany deplores the discussions surrounding the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments. The adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/75 C on transparency in armaments by an overwhelming majority bears ample witness to the importance the world community attaches to this CD agenda item. Furthermore, the TIA Ad Hoc Committee is the only forum in which - at least to some extent - conventional disarmament issues are dealt with in the CD. On substances, the constructive and fruitful discussions in last year's TIA Ad Hoc Committee have already demonstrated the need for further work. We are also prepared to contribute to advancing this important issue by assuming the chairmanship of that Committee if the Conference on Disarmament is willing so to decide.

In this context, I would like to point out that the issue of conventional disarmament deserves greater attention by this Conference. Conventional armed conflicts have increased in numbers and in their disastrous impact on people directly involved. Security problems in certain regions of the world deriving from conventional armed conflicts have become too obvious. Therefore, I urge the Conference on Disarmament to immediately re-establish the TIA Ad Hoc Committee and to start work in this important field. United Nations General Assembly resolutions 49/75 N and O contain operative paragraphs which specifically call upon the Conference on Disarmament to deal with certain issues in this regard. In my delegation's view it is high time to consider the topic of conventional disarmament in a more comprehensive fashion than in previous years. To this end, a first step could be taken when reviewing the agenda of this Conference.

My Government also attaches great importance to the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" and favours the early re-establishment of the respective Ad Hoc Committee. Germany has continuously contributed to the work of the Committee, inter alia, by providing the valuable input of experts to advance insights in the subject-matters. We have advocated giving the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate and, in the absence of this, at least to focus on confidence-building measures trying to

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

reduce suspicions and mistrust by creating a cooperative climate in the peaceful use of outer space. Despite the constraints on delegations by important ongoing negotiations, we should also get down to work in this Committee.

Let me turn to another high-priority issue on our agenda, a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. For my Government, a fissile material cut-off treaty is a key building block both in nuclear non-proliferation and in nuclear disarmament. Failure to establish a cut-off ad hoc committee and to start negotiations very soon would damage the role of the CD as the only multilateral negotiating body relating to arms control and disarmament. Starting negotiations in parallel to the CTBT negotiations right now is feasible. Although CTBT negotiations are predominant, deliberations on a cut-off in a negotiating format will enable us to better understand the main problems related to such a treaty. To secure the quick start of treaty negotiations we should agree on a mandate of the ad hoc committee based on the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 1993 adopted by consensus. In our opinion this mandate does not preclude any deliberation on the possible scope of such a treaty and we look forward to contributing to such a debate. I want to pay special tribute to the Government of Canada which hosted an informal workshop on questions regarding a cut-off convention. This workshop, which I had the honour to attend, clarified some issues and contributed towards reaching a decision on the establishment of a cut-off ad hoc committee. I look forward, Mr. President, to the outcome of the consultations of your Friend of the Chair, Ambassador Shannon, on the advisability of appointing a special coordinator. In my opinion, these consultations led by Ambassador Shannon should result right away in the establishment of a full-fledged ad hoc committee.

Despite numerous efforts the question of expansion of the CD membership unfortunately still stands unresolved. As we all know, the Conference on Disarmament will lose its credibility if legitimate requests for expansion of membership keep being disregarded. In principle, my Government therefore favours a solution that every State should become a member of the CD which presented a candidature. However, Germany supports every proposal which brings about a substantive and balanced expansion of the CD. A special coordinator on this question, yet to be appointed, can draw on the respective resolution adopted by consensus by the General Assembly.

In my delegation's view, the application for CD membership presented by the Slovak Republic is independent of the general issue of CD expansion. This candidacy must be dealt with in its own right. The former republic of Czechoslovakia was a CD member. The two succeeding States internally agreed that the Slovak Republic should have the right to take up the seat of the republic of Czechoslovakia. There is no reason why none of the successor States should be represented in this Conference. My Government therefore fully supports the candidature of the Slovak Republic to become a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): I welcome the presence of and express my appreciation for the statement made by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Mr. Mohamed-Salah Dembri, which testifies to the importance Algeria attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I congratulate you - a distinguished representative of a great nation with which Romania enjoys a long tradition of friendly relations - on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that your outstanding diplomatic skills and experience will be of great help in discharging the special responsibility always entrusted to the first President of a CD session. Already, after tireless efforts you succeeded to bring about agreement on the agenda and the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We still have, however, to solve some other important organizational problems. Please be assured that in all these endeavours you will have the full support of my delegation.

Allow me also to express our gratitude to Ambassador Sirous Nasseri of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who served as President in an exemplary manner during the last part of the 1994 session. We shall enjoy this year, I am sure, as we did last year, the professional and efficient assistance of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, his deputy, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, and all members of the secretariat.

I want to avail myself of this opportunity to bid farewell and express best wishes to our colleagues who have recently left their posts here or those who are to leave us soon. We shall miss them. I am however looking forward to closely cooperating with their successors so that together with all the members of the Conference we will responsibly meet the expectations of our nations and the whole international community in promoting disarmament and increasing security for all. I fully share the hope expressed here that the year 1995 will be the year of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. I hope that this session will also be a session of promoting restraint and transparency in conventional arms.

The end of bipolarity has not diminished but augmented the need for radical and sustainable progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. Never before has there been more opportunity for universal cooperation towards this goal. As an integral part of preventive diplomacy aimed at securing international peace and stability, the disarmament process has become increasingly comprehensive. While addressing both global and regional requirements, it now covers not only nuclear and other mass destruction weapons but also conventional arsenals, as well as confidence-building and transparency measures.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Nuclear disarmament has registered unprecedented strides during the last period of time. Nuclear-weapon complexes are now dismantling thousands of warheads per year in the implementation of START agreements and a common United States-Russian decision was taken to begin a process aimed at the eventual submission to IAEA inspection of all fissile material no longer needed for defence requirements. The commitment indicated by the two nuclear Powers to expedite the process envisaged by START I and II, as well as the willingness of other nuclear-weapon States to contribute in this respect, are remarkable steps that will substantially enhance global security and stability.

At the same time, United States-Russian detargeting of their nuclear missiles moves the world away from the hair-trigger nuclear posture that has threatened the second half of our century. Steady efforts have also been deployed to assure the removal of nuclear weapons from the newly independent States. The historic trilateral agreement among the United States, Russia and Ukraine to remove all nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine is perhaps the most important achievement of these efforts.

In the field of chemical disarmament, there is indeed no precedent for the chemical weapons Convention as a global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral treaty, which provides for the elimination of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. At this stage, we believe renewed efforts should be deployed to ensure the entry into force of and universal adherence to the CWC, as well as to prepare for the future implementation of this important legal instrument.

I am pleased to inform you that the Romanian Parliament unanimously ratified the Convention last November and the instruments of ratification will be shortly presented to the depositary. At the same time, measures pertaining to the implementation of the CWC have been taken, such as the establishment of the national authority and the preparation of a draft law on the enforcement of relevant provisions. A business community awareness seminar was held in Bucharest on 11 October 1994 which revealed the real interest of our chemical industry and trade people in the ongoing process.

Genuine implementation of the 1972 biological weapons Convention has been precluded so far by the lack of effective verification mechanisms guaranteeing international supervision of compliance. The special Conference of States Parties held last September in Geneva took important steps towards closing this loophole through efficient verification machinery meant to discourage any attempt to produce and use biological weapons. Thus, an ad hoc group of States parties to the BWC was established in order to consider appropriate steps, including possible verification measures and proposals to strengthen the Convention. Romania is ready to contribute to the success of elaboration by the ad hoc group of a verification regime which, in our opinion, should rely upon interweaving of different measures, i.e. data exchange, export controls, national technical means as well as routine and challenge inspections.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Positive steps have also been taken in order to reduce conventional arsenals, increase transparency in military activities and build confidence among States. Euro-Atlantic nations have contributed much in this respect by concluding the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe, a cornerstone in the effort to overcome suspicion and mistrust. Its current implementation benefits the overall security balance and we need to maintain the Treaty's viability and integrity in order to achieve its fundamental goals.

The Romanian Government also underlines the important contribution that the "open skies" Treaty can make to building confidence and enhancing transparency. My country has already ratified the Treaty and resolutely supports its entry into force as soon as possible.

There are less than three months ahead of us to the Conference of the States parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which will decide whether the NPT will continue in force indefinitely, or will be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. For 25 years this Treaty proved to be the primary normative foundation for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a milestone of global security and stability. Due to the NPT, for a quarter of a century there was no increase in the number of nuclear States, although pressures in the direction of proliferation were tremendous. Unique in terms of its great number of States parties, the NPT has registered more, significant adhesions since the 1990 review conference. We hope the Treaty will attract all the countries in the Middle East, as well as India, Pakistan and all the others that are still hesitating, so that the NPT can achieve fully its universal vocation.

Many other positive steps toward nuclear disarmament would not have been possible without the NPT. The conclusion of the INF and START agreements, the progress made so far in the negotiations on a CTBT, the clear perspective of an international halt to the production of weapons-grade materials and the recent return of North Korea to a responsible nuclear policy are only a few significant examples in this respect. Even more, the NPT has contributed much to the settlement of the nuclear issue that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. The recent accession of Ukraine and Belarus to the Treaty are most welcome steps and, at the same time, prerequisites for a sound European and global security environment in the years to come.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy among the States which have committed themselves to non-proliferation is another important merit of the NPT that has to be recalled.

While sharing the view that the Treaty should not be held hostage to solving other problems, yet we believe much work is to be done under a permanent NPT towards a CTBT, a fissile material "cut-off" treaty, a strengthened and strongly enforced safeguards regime with more powers to IAEA and a treaty granting positive and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Ready to pledge its full contribution for reaching these universal aims, Romania wishes to reiterate its entire support for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. In this spirit, my country

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

expressed the wish to associate itself with the European Union joint action on the preparations for the 1995 NPT conference, adopted last year, that aims at promoting the widest possible accession to the Treaty and at widening consensus on the objective of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in last year's General Assembly First Committee debates, reaching this objective will not only strengthen the effective implementation of the Treaty but will also speed progress towards the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

Promoting a steady policy aimed at strengthening security and stability at a regional and global level, the Romanian Government is deeply attached to the objective of preventing proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, as well as of conventional weapons under strict international control.

Strongly supporting the view that export controls are an essential lever for enforcing non-proliferation, Romania established the necessary mechanisms, procedures and lists of items, all similar to those convened within existing international non-proliferation regimes, including those in which it asked to be admitted. The trade in strategic items and technologies is now regulated by the Law on the Regime of Imports and Exports of Strategic Goods, adopted by the Parliament in November 1994. This law confirms the National Agency for Strategic Export Controls and Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as the competent body for checking the observance of legal procedures. The activity of the Agency is coordinated by an Interministerial Council composed of representatives from nine ministries. Upon the advice of the Agency, the Council decides on granting export and import licences.

The export controls assumed by various multilateral regimes based on mutual confidence and common shared values are an important complement to the mechanisms for the implementation of existing international treaties since their activity aims at preventing proliferation from the supply side, while the treaties control mechanisms address rather the recipient one.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty is one of the paramount priorities of the international community in the field of arms control and non-proliferation. Within the 1995 political environment, a fresh momentum is gathering for renewed efforts toward the achievement of this long-awaited goal. We highly appreciate the decisions taken by the United States to extend the nuclear testing moratorium until a CTB treaty enters into force. While no linkage should be made between the completion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and the NPT extension, decisive progress in the CTBT negotiations improves the environment for achieving the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT.

In order to attract the adherence of all States, a CTBT should be universally applicable and internationally and effectively verifiable. The international monitoring system basic elements that resulted during the December inter-sessional meeting of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee give us an idea of how these requirements can be met. Romania joined those who believe the IMS should rely upon four technologies: seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

and radionuclide. Further work yet remains to be done on defining the structure and objectives of the international data centre, as well as the concept of the future organization which will be designated to monitor the implementation of the treaty.

Let me take this opportunity to express our highest appreciation for the fruitful work that has been done by the former Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico. At the same time, I congratulate most warmly Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland on his election to this important post and pledge my delegation's full support for all his endeavours aimed at achieving concrete results in drafting the CTBT. I am sure Ambassador Dembinski's outstanding diplomatic skills and experience will be of the greatest help in this direction.

While giving priority to the NTB negotiations we hope that this will not mean exclusivity and that an agreement will be reached soon for re-establishing other subsidiary bodies, namely the transparency in armaments, nuclear security assurances and outer space ad hoc committees, which will give us the possibility of deepening the debate on these very important issues.

As far as transparency in armaments is concerned, my delegation deems it completely abnormal that, taking into account the fact that during the last five decades conventional weapons were the only ones used in conflicts, thereby causing significant casualties and material damage, we now have on our agenda almost exclusively items concerning nuclear weapons. You may recall that at the last United Nations General Assembly session a great number of countries, including developing ones, insistently advocated the need to adopt measures for cutting down the illicit traffic in conventional arms and for related assistance. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has himself drawn attention recently, at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to the fact that openness and transparency in military matters is essential to enhance confidence and trust among States, to help dissipate suspicions, and to contribute to global and regional stability. We therefore believe that deepening the dialogue on TIA is a must for the Conference on Disarmament if this body wants to remain faithful to its fundamental goals.

Further progress in TIA will contribute greatly to confidence-building and security among States. The promotion of transparency would encourage prudent restraint in the arms trade and reduce misunderstandings and tensions caused by lack of information. It might therefore be useful to set up appropriate measures in order to ensure that countries could never again acquire arsenals that go beyond their needs for self-defence.

In furtherance of the proposal put forward by the President of Romania, His Excellency Mr. Ion Iliescu, in June 1993, aimed at regulating arms transfers through a "code of conduct", as a first step towards an international treaty in this field, my delegation submitted on 17 May 1994 a draft code of conduct, circulated as document CD/1257. The draft was intended to stimulate the debate on establishing universal and non-discriminatory

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

principles and criteria to be followed by subscribing States in considering arms transfers. My delegation would be ready to continue working on this basis with other interested delegations.

Turning to another important issue, namely NSA, I would like to reiterate Romania's position that an arrangement in this respect should be premised upon a universal and legally binding international agreement providing for negative as well as positive security assurances that are global in scope, uniform and comprehensive and ensure the equality of all States renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons through multilateral treaties. At the same time, a search for a solution to the problem of security assurances should not leave aside the United Nations, entrusted by the international community with maintaining and strengthening international peace and security. Therefore, we favour the idea of a Security Council confirmation and extension - on a broader basis - of the commitments which were originally undertaken by the three nuclear-weapon States in resolution 255 (1968).

We hope the 1995 session will also register notable steps forward in the debates on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this respect, an open avenue could be that of confidence-building measures in space activities and the possible use of satellite observation by United Nations and regional bodies in order to improve crisis management and surveillance, verification of disarmament agreements and implementation of agreed CBMs. We deem the conditions are now ripe to put aside doctrinal debates and try to search areas of convergence on which palpable results could be achieved.

Before concluding, I would like to express our deep satisfaction at the decision to resume consultations on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. My Government maintains the view that it is now necessary to codify the cessation of the production of weapon-grade materials in a legally binding instrument which would reassure that world community that these materials are not being secretly produced or procured. I am confident that Ambassador Shannon's diplomatic talent and expertise will bring these consultations to early fruition and I pledge him my delegation's full support in his challenging endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine, Ambassador Slipchenko.

Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukraine): Mr. President, it is my privilege - speaking for the first time during this session of the Conference on Disarmament - to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency. Your skilful performance of these important and sometimes arduous functions was one of the crucial factors which enabled overcoming certain obstacles in the way of the resumption of the productive work of the Conference.

I have a special pleasure to address this body in the wake of Ukraine's accession to the NPT. This act crowned over two years of tireless efforts on

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

the part of my country and our partners in the negotiations in resolving the principal issues related to security assurances, compensation for nuclear weapons being removed from its territory and practical assistance in their dismantlement and destruction. In this respect I would like to draw your attention to CD document 1285 dated 21 December 1994 issued by our delegation together with the delegations of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, which contains the text of a Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the NPT. Similar assurances were given to Ukraine by China and France.

For Ukraine accession to the NPT has come as a result of its consistent policies aimed at realization of the goal of relinquishing nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR and thus acquiring non-nuclear status. It is appropriate to mention here that even before accession to the NPT Ukraine, in the vein of these policies and proving its reputation as a responsible agent of international relations, removed all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory - well ahead of schedule; it has also strictly abided by the coordinated timetable of the removal of strategic nuclear weapons. Last autumn Ukraine agreed to place its nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards. My Government has clearly expressed its readiness to become a part of the Missile Technology Control Regime and join the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

It is our sincere hope that Ukraine's accession to the NPT, bearing special significance on the eve of the Conference of the States parties to the Treaty, will have a positive impact upon the process of nuclear disarmament, will contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and will enhance global stability.

Within this context, we would expect the early ratification of START II by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and concrete steps to be taken by three other nuclear States in order to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery, as well as achieving tangible progress on the number of important political issues on the CD's agenda.

This comprises inter alia the question of security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States. We support those delegations which have spoken for the elaboration of a comprehensive and legally binding document to this effect and feel that the efforts of the Conference in this field should be redoubled in order to reach agreement on a formula acceptable to all parties concerned.

No less important is the issue of the cessation of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We deem it necessary to establish the corresponding Ad Hoc Committee which would be entrusted with the elaboration of the agreement on the unconditional cessation of production of all types of weapons-grade fissile material under efficient and objective control, applicable also to the storage and use of already existing stocks of fissile material.

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

In its resolution 49/70 the United Nations General Assembly defined negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a high-priority task. I would like to reiterate the unswerving support of my country for the work being carried out at the CD in order to achieve the above goal in the shortest possible time. We wish Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, recently appointed the Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, every success in his endeavours. We also hail with satisfaction the measures announced by the Deputy Direct of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Earle, in his statement at the first plenary of this session.

On this occasion I would like to inform the Conference that the Ukrainian authorities - willing to contribute to the creation of the efficient international monitoring system under the treaty - have taken decision to give consent to the incorporation of Ukrainian seismic stations in such a system and their participation to this end in the GSETT-3 arrangements. Relevant information has been forwarded to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

Ukraine's vision of the CTBT is that of a treaty which is to ban - unconditionally and effectively - all types of nuclear tests in any environment by any country, including the verifiable closure of all nuclear test sites, without any exclusion.

We are convinced that all negotiations either actual or prospective within the cadre of the CD and beyond should be conducive to attaining the goal of universal and complete nuclear disarmament no matter how distant it seems at this moment.

The previous history of the Conference testifies to its ability to find appropriate answers to the most difficult questions in the area of arms control and disarmament. In this respect it is highly regrettable that the CD has failed so far to use its negotiating capacities and experience to reach consensus on the outstanding issue of its expansion which, in our view, has already transcended the domain of procedural problems calling into question the credibility of the CD as a major international forum. We expect that new momentum to this work will be given by United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/77 B which for the first time specifically addressed the issue of the expansion of the membership of the CD and urged the Conference to make every effort to reach a solution resulting in a significant expansion of its composition. We expect that this resolution will be taken due account of by the special coordinator who is to be appointed - hopefully, without unnecessary delay, with a clear mandate and taking into consideration the balance of interests of all regional groups of the CD - by you, Mr. President.

The enlarged composition of the Conference is essential not only for ensuring more representative participation in the negotiations on the CTBT, but also for the discussion of other issues on the CD's agenda which affect the interests of the countries whose number by far exceeds the CD's membership list. We think that this course of action would be especially appropriate

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

this year, the year of the United Nations' fiftieth anniversary which is also marked by so many events of crucial importance for the disarmament debate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of office. We have high confidence in your ability to lead us through the challenges we face in establishing an effective programme of work for the year, and I can assure you of my delegation's full cooperation. In particular, we note that the establishment of the CTBT negotiating mechanism is almost complete and has started work. We commend particularly your efforts in this regard.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my regrets at the impending departure of our colleague, the Ambassador of Japan. We wish him well. It is appropriate in a statement on CTBT, which this is, to recall Ambassador Tanaka's historic chairmanship of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee in 1993 which launched the current negotiation. His great contribution will be remembered.

My delegation considers that at the start of its 1995 session, it is appropriate for us in the Conference on Disarmament to reflect carefully on the international community's expectations of us. All of the 1994 areas of work of this Conference were the subject of resolutions carried by the General Assembly and we would wish to see work started in 1995 in all of these areas. I do not believe, however, that any in this room would deny that the most precise expectations by far were those set out in the comprehensive-test-ban-treaty resolution, to which my German and other colleagues have already referred. The wholehearted endorsement of this resolution from every quarter was made absolutely clear by the historic decision of all five of the nuclear-weapon States to join in co-sponsorship for the first time.

We believe the time has now come to give this commitment concrete expression, and to grasp the equally historic - and quite possibly unique - negotiating opportunity which lies before us. This opportunity, if squandered, could easily slip from our grasp for some years, leaving only recriminations and regret at our loss of significant disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation advances which have been our objective for decades.

Allow me, Mr. President, to recall a number of the key elements of resolution 49/70, and to draw out some of the implications for us now as we make decisions on the approach we take to organizing our work for 1995.

Operative paragraph 1 of that resolution reminds us all that notwithstanding the desire of many delegations - including my own - to move faster than the Conference found possible in 1994, we nevertheless elaborated a rolling text of impressive scope by the year's end. Despite the clouds of

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

brackets, the obvious structural quirks, and the occasional yawning holes, a 114-page document generated in only 26 weeks of negotiation cannot be dismissed as an insignificant achievement for a multilateral negotiating process. It provides an invaluable basis and resource for the resumption of negotiations.

It also rests as a tribute to the positive and substantial engagement of many delegations, and to the leadership of Ambassador Marín Bosch as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. It reflects the unflagging efforts of Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski in leading their respective working groups, and of the Friends of the Chair operating in support of these efforts. It is a corporate achievement which gives my delegation - and should give the international community as a whole - confidence in the Conference's ability to deliver a final result.

Operative paragraph 2 called on the Conference to advance work in the inter-sessional period with a view to making substantial progress. Again, we were pleased to see some significant forward steps: we reached consensus on the incorporation into the treaty of four monitoring technologies (seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound), and found a large measure of convergence on important details of implementation. Policy issues in need of resolution have been more clearly defined and identified. Major progress was achieved in developing common understandings of technical issues relating to on-site inspection. My delegation believes this work has provided useful foundations upon which the Conference can advance rapidly in completing the text of the treaty's verification package.

Operative paragraph 3, with its call upon the Conference at the start of the 1995 session "to proceed to a new phase of negotiation", is one which particularly deserves our attention. There was an expectation in New York that the models which had served effectively in 1994, in the production of the rolling text, would need to make way in 1995 for new and more imaginative modes of negotiation. It was appreciated that full formal meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups, while efficient for collating material which both reflected and protected preferred national positions, might not necessarily be quite so effective in promoting productive negotiations towards closure on issues, and towards the compromises necessary to achieve this. Of course, this need for a change of gears is not a new revelation. It reflects the way in which the Conference has traditionally operated, including in the chemical weapons Convention negotiations, once it perceives that the end, while still at some distance, is at least in sight.

Consequently, I believe it accurate to say that the international community and many if not all delegations in this room are looking to 1995 as a year in which we apply a fresh impetus towards closure; a year in which we increasingly work as a Committee and working groups supported by smaller and less formal groups - appropriately coordinated so as to guarantee transparency of process. The time for set-piece debates on procedure or on terminology and the adding of yet more brackets has passed, and we need to assert this

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

fundamental fact in our work plans. 1995 is most assuredly not intended to be "business as usual"; there should be a new flexibility aimed at achieving results.

Following on from this, operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution were remarkably plain and to the point: the remit from the international community is for the Conference "... to negotiate intensively ... and to conclude a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty ...". The expectation - an expectation to which all of our Governments subscribed, many by way of co-sponsorship - was for negotiations which clearly demonstrate not only an intensity of activity, but also achievement in terms of a finished product, and this without delay. The same operative paragraphs point towards the levels of commitment which will be required by all delegations participating in the negotiation if we are to achieve this conclusion in 1995. Concluding the negotiations will require hard work by all delegations. It will require willingness to commit diplomatic resources to the staffing of positions within the Committee as required, and to supporting in good faith an increasingly multi-stranded and intensive effort, including a preparedness to work inter-sessionally.

It is also obvious that the progress we can make on certain important topics will reflect the degree to which the testing States can collectively agree to move forward. Leadership has already been shown, and more will be needed in the future to help us advance on the more persistent differences confronting us in the rolling text. In this context, the recent steps announced by the United States to extend its testing moratorium and to rescind its earlier "special withdrawal" proposal are particularly commendable, enhancing as they do the practical possibilities for consensus while at the same time confirming a deep and abiding commitment to the negotiation. Australia would wish to place clearly on record its appreciation of these decisions, as well as the continued suspension of testing by others among the nuclear-weapon States.

It follows from all of this that we need to give serious collective thought to precise negotiating strategies which will best achieve the shared and clear objectives to which we all subscribed in New York. There is of course no magic formula. There are, however, a number of ways in which we could organize ourselves and I would venture to highlight some basic approaches which, in the view of my delegation, would contribute to closure. First, in order to make further progress, in order to move decisively to the "new phase of negotiation", we need clearly to identify where the central issues lie in our somewhat unruly rolling text. In our view one could probably identify six topic-centred "clusters" of significant issues where we are yet to reach consensus. In rough order of importance, these appear to us to be scope, verification, organization, entry into force, review and amendments, and duration and withdrawal.

Second, it would seem that the differences between delegations on issues within these "clusters" are not readily amenable to resolution at the level of drafting. There are serious choices here requiring considered political

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

decision. Consensus may not readily emerge in open meetings of the Committee unless the Committee itself and its working groups is supported by an energetic and intensive programme of formal and informal consultations aimed at producing convergence. We would wish to avoid a stylised formal process where bracketed text is examined and re-examined but progress is minimal. Rather, we think that as in the case of previous negotiations, the Committee will be at its most productive if operating in tandem with intensive consultations pursued with the active blessing of the Committee and its working groups. At the same time, the Committee will need to highlight for Governments exactly what the issues are and what decisions are necessary in order to activate a productive negotiating process.

Third, it seems to us that we should be quite clear in our message to Governments and the international community that with these clusters resolved, we will be in reach of a completed treaty. Governments need to recognize that the time has come for making serious decisions to achieve convergence.

Finally, in order to respond to the General Assembly's call to direct our efforts towards concluding, and not simply negotiating, the treaty, we will need to have very considerable progress towards closure in most of these "clusters" by the end of the first part of our 1995 session. It is traditionally the first part of our annual session which provides the greatest opportunity for serious and sustained work. If we have not achieved marked progress by its end, we will truly have difficulty in reaching the desired goal of a completed treaty text this year.

While claiming no special insight, I should like also to offer brief observations on what my delegation sees as critical choices embedded in two of the clusters of issues I identified earlier. Amongst the legal and institutional issues, it seems to us that the question of scope is of considerable practical and symbolic importance. Progress here is fundamental to overall achievement. Lack of movement could be seized upon as evidence of deadlock. Here perhaps more than elsewhere, it seems obvious that there is a limited political envelope within which we can construct a treaty article. The maintenance of positions towards the extreme ends which disregard the political realities of the negotiation - and possibly our negotiating mandate - will increasingly be seen as incompatible with a serious commitment to closure.

All delegations are committed via the mandate to concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In our view there is patently little support for complicating the negotiation by broadening the scope to include explicit bans on computer simulation and laboratory procedures. At the other extreme, we believe the international community as a whole will simply not accept the concepts of nuclear explosions for peaceful or exceptional circumstances; nor can we see the international community entertaining ideas we have seen reported for the acceptance of nuclear explosions under a CTBT with tons - some mention hundreds of tons - of explosive yield. We do not see such

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

views exercising meaningful leverage on the final text of a treaty. We hope all delegations in coming to this realization find themselves in a position to move towards the middle ground and consensus positions sooner rather than later.

In the field of verification, we are looking to move smartly to consolidate and extend upon the real progress achieved at the end of 1995. We are confident that the international monitoring system Expert Group, currently meeting under the able chairmanship of Dr. Peter Marshall, will provide the technical convergence and input necessary for us to finalize drafting of key parts of the verification protocol. We believe significant and concrete textual advances should be possible in the relatively near future. However, on the level of verification policy, a series of important questions will need to be resolved in order to make further textual progress. These include how we will fund treaty verification facilities; to what degree verification data will be processed and analysed by the CTBT organization prior to distribution; how precisely we will handle the modalities of on-site inspection together with any necessary consultations and clarifications; and what data the CTBT organization may take into account. As elsewhere, intensive formal consultations may assist in precipitating a consensus which we feel is not that far off.

The task we are facing is a heavy one, and one which will place particularly heavy burdens on those holding office within the Committee. In offering my delegation's sincere congratulations to Ambassadors Dembinski and Ramaker for their election to chairmanship of the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee and to the legal and institutional Working Group respectively, I would wish to convey to them Australia's appreciation of their willingness to take up these burdens on our collective behalf, and to assure them of my delegation's unfailing support in striving towards our common objective.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. We have exhausted our list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

If this is not the case, I should like to mention that, following the adoption on 3 February of the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session, certain pending issues remain to be dealt with. These relate to the appointment of a special coordinator on the review of the agenda and a special coordinator on expansion of membership, as well as the possibility of the re-establishment, as soon as possible, of the ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and transparency in armaments, as well as any other ad hoc committees which may be agreed on following further consultations. I intend to spare no effort in ordering to bring about early agreement on all these pending issues so that the Conference can indeed put into effect all the provisions outlined in the Presidential statement.

(The President)

At my request, the secretariat has circulated a tentative timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week. It was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I consider that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As agreed, the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 14 February at 10 a.m. Before adjourning, I should like to remind you that we will be holding, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting which will be limited to the presence of members of the Conference only.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.